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Abstract Distortions of time perception are generally
explained either by variations in the rate of pacing signals
of an “internal clock”, or by lag-adaptation mechanisms
that recalibrate the perceived time of one event relative to
another. This study compares these accounts directly for
one temporal illusion: the subjective compression of the
interval between voluntary actions and their eVects,
known as ‘intentional binding’. Participants discriminated
whether two cutaneous stimuli presented after voluntary
or passive movements were simultaneous or successive.
In other trials, they judged the temporal interval between
their movement and an ensuing tone. Temporal discrimi-
nation was impaired following voluntary movements
compared to passive movements early in the action-tone
interval. In a control experiment, active movements with-
out subsequent tones produced no impairment in temporal
discrimination. These results suggest that voluntary
actions transiently slow down an internal clock during the
action-eVect interval. This in turn leads to intentional
binding, and links the eVects of voluntary actions to the
self.
Introduction
Distortions of the passage of time are commonplace: “time
Xies when you’re having fun”, but “the watched pot never
boils”.
One view attributes such distortions to modulation of a
neural pacing signal, the “internal clock” (Treisman 1963;
Gibbon et al. 1984; Matell and Meck 2004) that varies with
stimulation and motor activity (e.g., Wearden et al. 1999).
When clock rate decreases durations subjectively appear
shorter because fewer internal time units accumulate in a
given interval (e.g., Morrone et al. 2005). Conversely,
when clock rate increases, durations seem longer (e.g.,
Hodinott-Hill et al. 2002).
Another view explains temporal illusions as recalibra-
tions of the perceived onset time of sensory events. Predict-
able events, such as those produced by voluntary
movements, may be pre-dated in order to ensure perceptual
constancy (Yarrow et al. 2001), causality (Stetson et al.
2006), or sense of agency (Haggard et al. 2002).
Critically, recalibration theories account for temporal
illusions as shifts by a constant interval of one timing
stream relative to another, without changes in the rate of
passage of time. Lag adaptation experiments support this
possibility. For example, asynchronies between visual and
auditory onsets, as in dubbed movies, soon become imper-
ceptible, yet speaking rate appears normal (Fujisaki et al.
2004; Vatakis et al. 2007).
Many illusions involving modulation of subjective time
Wt either clock-rate explanations, time-shift explanations, or
a hybrid of both. Here, we directly compared clock-rate and
time-shift accounts of a temporal illusion known as ‘inten-
tional binding’. When a voluntary action is followed by a
sensory eVect (a tone), the action is perceived to occur later
and the tone earlier than in control conditions with only
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actions, only tones, or involuntary TMS-induced move-
ments plus tones (Haggard et al. 2002). People also perceive
action-eVect intervals as shorter than control intervals when
estimating durations directly (Engbert et al. 2007, 2008).
In Experiment 1 participants made active or passive
movements that were followed by tones after a short inter-
val. Participants either estimated the interval duration
[interval estimation (IE)], or judged whether two mild
shocks delivered after action onset were successive or
simultaneous (see Fig. 1).
Both clock-rate and time-shift theories predict shorter IE
in the active than passive conditions, due to intentional
binding. In contrast, the two accounts make diVerent pre-
dictions regarding temporal discrimination (TD) of shocks
during the action-eVect interval (see Fig. 2 for model
assumptions and predictions). If intentional binding reXects
a slowed internal clock, then TD thresholds (TDTs) should
increase following voluntary but not passive movements. A
decrease in internal clock rate should produce an increase
in TDTs because two shocks would be more likely to occur
within a single, lengthened clock pulse.
Alternatively, clock slowing may be transient, rather
than sustained throughout the action-eVect interval. For
example, if initial clock slowing is followed by a compen-
satory acceleration of clock rate, then increased TDTs
should be restricted to stimulation immediately after
action, and the perception of interval duration should be
relatively unaVected. Finally, if intentional binding is due
only to time-shifts, without clock-rate change, TDTs
should not diVer between the two movement conditions.
In addition, a control experiment (Exp. 2) investigated TD
of shocks when active movements were not followed by
tones. The purpose of Exp. 2 was to assess the potential
impact of attentional lapses on TDTs that are caused by




Twenty paid right-handed subjects participated in Exp. 1
with local ethical committee approval. One participant was
rejected, leaving 19 subjects (13 female, mean age,
24.6 years). For the excluded participant, the detection
threshold procedure (see below) was unsuccessful, since
she failed to detect even shocks that were 50% stronger
Fig. 1 Schematic illustration of trials in Exp. 1. Active and passive
movements are followed by a tone after varying intervals. Two shocks
are applied early or late within the action-eVect interval, or after the
tone. a On interval estimation trials participants estimate the interval
between keypress and tone. Shock timing is determined by randomly
drawing from one of the three staircases of the TD task. b On temporal
discrimination trials the interval between the shocks is varied by a
staircase procedure. Participants judge whether or not shocks are
simultaneous. In Exp. 2 participants made active movements that were
not followed by tones and always judged the simultaneity of the shocksExp Brain Res (2009) 196:311–318 313
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than those used for other participants.1 Fourteen paid right-
handed subjects (11 female, mean age 22.8 years) partici-
pated in Exp. 2.
Design and procedure
Subjects’ right index and middle Wngers were taped
together, and a Velcro loop around the tip of the middle
Wnger was attached to a wooden plate. Bipolar electrodes
(4 mm diameter) were placed on the dorsal middle pha-
lange of index and middle Wngers (see Fig. 1). The elec-
trodes were covered by the tape to ensure good skin
contact. In the active movement conditions participants
depressed a key beneath the wooden plate by moving down
the taped Wngers at a time of their choosing. They were
asked to make discrete, fast movements in order to ensure
maximum comparability between movement conditions
and to limit variance in IE (see below). In the passive con-
dition, the plate, and the Wngers with it, was depressed by a
servo motor a random 1,450–4,450 ms after trial start.
Motor onset times were drawn from a reaction time distri-
bution produced by two pilot subjects. The key and motor
were shielded from participants’ view. Active and passive
movements were tested in separate blocks in counterbal-
anced order.
We Wrst used a staircase procedure (Levitt 1971) to iden-
tify the intensity at which approximately 80% of shocks
were detected on one electrode, 10 ms after a keypress. The
electrode tested for detection (index or middle Wnger elec-
trode) was counterbalanced across subjects. Intensity was
varied by adjusting the stimulator pulse-width. Separate
detection thresholds were found for active and passive key-
presses, because active movements produce sensory attenu-
ation (Williams et al. 1998). Experimental testing was
performed at 135% of the estimated detection threshold in
each condition, so that all shocks were clearly perceptible.
A separate staircase was then used to adjust the intensity of
the second electrode so it subjectively matched the Wrst at
the experimental level.
Each keypress (measured by a microswitch) produced a
tone after an 600, 800, or 1,000 ms interval, chosen at ran-
dom (Fig. 1). Tones were 70 ms in duration and 500 Hz in
frequency. A prompt 600 ms after the tone either indicated
to estimate the interval between keypress and tone in ms
(IE trials), or to judge whether the two shocks were
1 At the time of testing, it was unclear whether this reXected an unusu-
ally conservative detection criterion, a failure to understand the
instructions of the detection task, a particularly poor electrical interface
between skin and electrodes, or a technical malfunction of the stimula-
tor itself. Any of these explanations would have made continuing the
experiment diYcult and of doubtful scientiWcally value. Therefore, the
experiment was discontinued.
Fig. 2 Models of subjective time. a Recalibration/time-shift. (1) The
perceived time of anticipated eVects following voluntary movements is
shifted backwards in time towards the action that caused them. This
subjectively shortens action-eVect intervals relative to passive control
conditions (2), but clock speed remains unchanged, and so therefore
does temporal discrimination (3). b Constant clock slowing. (1) Oper-
ant movements reduce clock speed throughout the action-eVect inter-
val. (2) Because fewer clock ticks accumulate, the action-eVect interval
appears shorter following active than passive movements. (3) Clock
slowing also impairs temporal discrimination during the action-eVect
interval, as the interval required to resolve successive stimuli is in-
creased. c Dynamic clock modulation. (1) Initial clock slowing is fol-
lowed by an increase of clock rate that partially compensates for the
“lost” time. If compensation is underpowered, action-eVect intervals
seem shorter than after passive movements (2), but early impairments
in temporal discrimination are followed by compensatory improve-
ments (3)314 Exp Brain Res (2009) 196:311–318
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simultaneous or successive (TD trials). The trial types were
chosen randomly and equiprobably. Thus, subjects could
not predict whether they would judge the action-eVect
interval or shock simultaneity.
On TD trials, the interval between the shocks was con-
trolled by a staircase procedure to estimate the temporal
discrimination threshold (TDT). Three separate staircases
were interleaved, for shocks immediately following the
action (early stimulation time: Average shock 150 ms after
keypress), late during the action-tone interval (average
150 ms before the tone, hence 450, 650 or 850 ms after the
action, for action-tone intervals of 600, 800 or 1,000 ms),
and for stimulation after the tone (250 ms after tone onset).
Shock onset was triggered by the keypress, as measured by
microswitch. The three staircases were run in parallel, and
trials were chosen from each staircase at random. The order
of shocks (index Wnger then middle Wnger or vice versa)
was also randomised. Each (descending) staircase started
with an inter-stimulus interval of 300 ms, suYcient for par-
ticipants to reliably perceive the shocks as successive. Ini-
tial step size was 60 ms, which was successively reduced
by a factor of 3. Each staircase ended after a minimum of 4
reversals (Levitt 1971). TDT was deWned as the mean inter-
shock intervals of the third and fourth reversals.
On IE trials, participants made unspeeded verbal judge-
ments of the duration of the interval between the moment
that the key went down and the onset of the tone. They
were told that interval length would range between 1 ms
and 1,000 ms, and were reminded that 1,000 ms correspond
to 1 s. Participants were encouraged not to restrict them-
selves to round numbers but instead to use the full numeri-
cal range. Before the experiment started subjects were
provided with a “short” and a “long” reference interval for
demonstration, and they received some practice with both
IE and TD tasks alone, until they were familiar with the
procedure. During the experiment itself, however, no refer-
ence interval was provided, nor was knowledge of results
given at any stage. Shock timing on IE trials was deter-
mined by randomly drawing from one of the three stair-
cases. At the end of each trial, the experimenter recorded
the judgement (interval estimate or simultaneity judge-
ment), and initiated the next trial by pressing the Enter key
after asking “Ready?”.
Exp. 2 diVered from Exp. 1 in that (a) only active move-
ments were required, (b) no tones were presented, and (c)
the TD task was the only task.
Results
Interval estimates (see Fig. 3a) were analyzed using a
2 £ 3 £ 3 ANOVA with movement condition (active, pas-
sive), action-eVect interval (AEI; 600, 800, 1,000 ms), and
stimulation time (early, late, after) as within subjects fac-
tors. Intervals were perceived as shorter with active than
passive movements, F(1,18) = 23.3,  P < 0.01. The main
eVect of action-eVect interval was unsurprisingly signiW-
cant, F(2, 36) = 43.3, P < 0.01, indicating that participants
were able to track the physical variation of the interval.
However, the eVect of interval did not interact with movement
Fig. 3 Results (error bars show standard errors across individuals). a
Mean interval estimates (in ms) according to movement condition and
action-eVect interval. b Mean temporal discrimination thresholds
(TDTs) as a function of movement condition and time of stimulation.
c Modulation of TDTs in the active movement conditions of Exps. 1
and 2. Overall diVerences between experiments have been removed, to
show the residual modulation of TDT across stimulation timesExp Brain Res (2009) 196:311–318 315
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condition, F(2,36) < 1, P > 0.4. Finally, the average onset
time of shock stimuli did not inXuence interval estimation
(all eVects involving stimulation time, P’s > 0.15).
Temporal discrimination thresholds (see Fig. 3b, c) were
analyzed as follows.
First we compared the TDTs for the active and passive
movement condition of Exp. 1 at the diVerent stimulation
times (early, late, after). This analysis yielded a signiWcant
main eVect of stimulation time, F(2,36) = 7.99, P <0 . 0 1 ,
no signiWcant eVect of movement condition, F(1,18) < 1,
but a highly signiWcant interaction between these factors,
F(2,36) = 8.8,  P < 0.01. The interaction was further ana-
lyzed by simple eVect tests for both factors: TDTs diVered
across stimulation times for active movements, F(2,
36) = 13.73,  P < 0.01, but not for passive movements,
F(2,36) < 1, P > 0.5, while active and passive conditions
diVered for early, but not late shocks: t(18) = 2.98,
P <0 . 0 1 ,  t(18) = ¡1.06, P > 0.3, with an additional diVer-
ence after the tone, t(18) = ¡2.36, P = 0.03. However, Bon-
ferroni correction for three comparisons would give a
critical P value of 0.017, suggesting caution regarding the
comparison following the tone. We conclude that temporal
discrimination was impaired immediately following oper-
ant actions, but reverted to the same level as passive move-
ments later in the interval, and prior to the tone.
Second, to evaluate whether the intentional binding
eVect in the IE task of Exp. 1 was best explained by a sus-
tained or by a temporary decrease in clock rate (Fig. 2b vs.
c) we used multiple regression analysis to predict inten-
tional binding (IE for active–passive movements) from
TDTs. We transformed the TDT data into separate vari-
ables reXecting sustained and dynamic clock rate change,
and used these variables to predict intentional binding. The
total diVerence between active and passive TDTs in the
action eVect interval (i.e., the sum of the early and late
stimulation diVerences between the active and the passive
condition) was taken as an indicator of sustained change in
clock rate, while the change between TDTs for early and
late stimulation times (i.e., active minus passive TDT at
early stimulation minus the active–passive diVerence at late
stimulation) was taken to indicate dynamic clock rate
change. The overall model with both predictors was signiW-
cant, F(2,16) = 4.42, P < 0.05, but only dynamic clock-rate
change predicted variance in intentional binding. The stan-
dardized weight for dynamic TDT change was
(dyn) = 0.6,  t =2 . 9 6 ,  P < 0.01, whereas for sustained
overall TDT it was (sus) = ¡0.14, t =0 . 6 8 ,  P > 0.5. This
result suggests that intentional binding reXects dynamic
changes of clock rate (Fig. 2c).
Finally, in order to determine whether the TDT modula-
tion found for active movements in Exp. 1 was speciWc to
operant actions, or due to attentional lapses associated with
voluntary movements, we compared the TDTs following
active operant movements (Exp. 1) with the TDTs for
movements without tone-eVects (Exp. 2). To this end we
conducted a 2 (Experiment) £ 3 (stimulation time) mixed
factors ANOVA on active movement TDTs. TDTs were
generally lower in Exp. 2, F(1,31) = 16.2, P < 0.01, sug-
gesting that omission of IE trials in that experiment may
have allowed subjects to focus attention on the TD task,
thus improving temporal discrimination. The main eVect
of stimulation time was also signiWcant, F(2,62) = 13.88,
P < 0.01, as was the interaction between experiment and
stimulation time, F(2,62) = 5.94,  P < 0.01. Figure 3c
shows the residual TDT values for each condition after
removing the main eVects of experiment, capturing the
nature of this interaction more clearly. Residual TDTs
were computed by subtracting participants’ average TDT
across stimulation times from their TDTs at each stimula-
tion time. Simple eVect tests were conducted to analyze the
interaction further, and a Bonferroni correction for three
comparisons was used, setting the P value at 0.017. The
ANOVA of Exp. 2 TDTs with stimulation time as the only
factor showed that TDTs were increased during early and
late stimulation as compared to stimulation “after the
tone”, F(2, 26) = 6.4, P < 0.01. More importantly, TDTs in
the operant actions of Exp. 1 diVered from those in the
non-operant actions of Exp. 2: the residual TDT values
after removing the main eVect of experiment showed that
TDTs were higher immediately after an operant action
than after non-operant action t(31) = ¡2.991, P < 0.01, but
that this diVerence reversed for later stimulation
t(31) = 2.8, P < 0.01. TDTs did not diVer across experi-
ments for stimulation after the tone t(31) = ¡1.04, P >0 . 3 .
This pattern of results suggests that a dynamic change in
clock rate is speciWc to operant actions which produce a
predictable eVect, and does not occur as a simple by-prod-
uct of motor action.
Discussion
Our study yielded three important results. First, we
observed a large intentional binding eVect in the IE task.
Consistent with previous Wndings (Engbert et al. 2007,
2008), IE judgements that directly address the relation
between actions and eVects led to a larger and more robust
eVect than those typically observed with event timing
judgements that require separate time judgements for
actions and eVects (e.g., Haggard et al. 2002). Intentional
binding is unlikely to be due to diVerential interpretation of
“movement” in the active and passive conditions because
previous  Wndings show that active movements are per-
ceived as occurring earlier than passive movements when
judged in isolation (e.g., Haggard et al. 2004). Second, our
data revealed a clear deterioration of temporal discrimination316 Exp Brain Res (2009) 196:311–318
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immediately following voluntary actions, but not later in
the action-eVect interval. This deterioration was not due to
a transient loss of attention caused by the demands of vol-
untary movement, because it was restricted to operant
actions that predictably produced perceptual eVects (Exp.
1), and was not found for identical actions without percep-
tual eVects (Exp. 2). Third, the deterioration of temporal
discrimination was correlated across subjects with subjec-
tive temporal compression of the action-eVect interval.
Importantly, these changes cannot be explained by the well-
known phenomena of sensory attenuation (Williams et al.
1998). First, we separately determined experimental shock
intensities for active and passive movements, so shocks
were equally detectable and salient across conditions. Thus,
temporal discrimination impairment following active
movements cannot be explained by impaired shock detect-
ability due to sensory attenuation. Second, sensory suppres-
sion cannot explain the diVerence in temporal discrimination
between experiments 1 and 2.
Could these changes in time perception reXect division
of attention? We should distinguish two senses of attention:
dividing attention between tasks, and dynamically allocat-
ing attention to successive events. TDTs were indeed
higher when subjects attended to both IE and TD tasks
(Exp. 1), compared to TD alone (Exp. 2). Dividing atten-
tion between tasks might impair “on-line accumulation of
temporal pulses” (Coull et al. 2004, p. 1506). However,
divided attention cannot easily explain the interaction
between tone occurrence and shock time. TDTs increased
for shocks just after operant actions, with later shocks
showing the reverse pattern. This interaction also rules out
explanations based on dynamic allocation of attention.
Making voluntary actions might produce a psychological
refractory period (cf. RuthruV and Pashler 2001; Tombu
and Jolicoeur 2003), which could impair processing of
shock events, thus increasing TDTs. The elevated TDTs
following non-operant actions in Exp. 2 might reXect such
an attentional eVect. However, this refractory eVect should
be similar for actions with and without tones if transient
changes in attention were the primary cause of TDT deteri-
oration in the operant action condition. The statistical inter-
action between shock time and tone occurrence shows that
this was not the case. Reduced attention to the interval as a
consequence of dynamic allocation of attention to the
expected tone cannot easily explain our results either,
because active and passive movements in Exp. 1 produced
comparable tones. Thus, our results cannot be attributed to
attention alone.
Instead, the transient modulation of temporal discrimina-
tion in operant actions seems to reXect a genuine change in
time perception. However, the changes in temporal dis-
crimination cannot be explained simply by a time-shift
eVect induced by operant actions (Fig. 2a). Time shift
theory proposes that the internal structure of time is unal-
tered. The core assumption is that the alignment between
two clocks is adaptable, but the rate of each individual
clock is not. Therefore the shift account can explain almost
any change regarding when a single event is perceived to
occur in relation to another. However, it cannot explain any
change in TD ability within the adapted interval: Individual
time slices or ‘clock ticks’ are thought to remain constant,
which predicts comparable TDTs across conditions (see
Fig. 2).
Rather, our data suggest that voluntary operant actions
transiently slow down an internal clock, in anticipation of
the eVect of the action. Two shocks are thus more likely to
fall within a single clock period, impairing temporal dis-
crimination. In addition, clock slowing means that fewer
clock cycles will occur between action and tone, producing
the compression of the perceived interval between action
and eVect (i.e., intentional binding). This change in clock
rate is quite brief: TDTs increased immediately following
operant actions, but were not increased later in the action-
eVect interval. Moreover, binding eVects in IE were more
strongly related to the dynamic change in TDTs across the
action eVect interval than to the average TDT level during
the interval. Thus, the dynamic rate modulation model of
Fig. 2c best accounts for our results. According to this
model, initial clock slowing is followed by compensatory
rebound acceleration. Rebound acceleration would have the
eVect of adjusting for “lost time” following the action (cf.
Yarrow et al. 2001). However, our interval estimation data
suggest that this compensation is incomplete. If initial
clock slowing were exactly compensated by subsequent
clock acceleration, there would be no net eVect on per-
ceived interval duration. Incomplete compensation, how-
ever, would produce temporal compression as in intentional
binding. Incomplete compensation appears to be a general
principle of many neural adjustments, including saccadic
gain adaptation (e.g., McLaughlin 1967), and perceptual
scaling (Taylor-Clarke et al. 2004). The nervous system
may favor partial compensation over complete compensa-
tion or overcompensation on grounds of robustness.
Sustained slowing of an internal clock without any com-
pensation (Fig. 2b) would produce a binding eVect that
increases with interval length. However, in our study, inten-
tional binding was constant across intervals. This result
implies that slowing was transient. It is consistent with our
Wnding of reduced TDT later in the action interval, which
implies a compensatory acceleration of an internal clock.
Compensation for clock rate slowing occurred before the
end of the shortest action-eVect interval (600 ms in our
data). Our study randomised the action-eVect interval, and
did not estimate separate TDTs for each interval. Therefore,
we cannot determine whether compensatory acceleration
occurs within a Wxed time window after action, or whetherExp Brain Res (2009) 196:311–318 317
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the compensation is predictively timed to occur just prior to
the eVect. In future research, we plan to use more predict-
able intervals, and check if temporal discrimination shows
compensatory adjustment immediately before the predicted
end of the interval.
We found that diVerences between conditions in time
discrimination were consistent with diVerences in per-
ceived interval duration. Moreover, changes in one measure
were correlated across subjects with changes in the other.
Not all timing illusions show this level of consistency. Stet-
son et al. (2007) found that the increased perceived dura-
tion of a whole-body motion (a 31 m free-fall) was not
associated with any change in visual Xicker fusion fre-
quency. An important diVerence between their result and
ours may be the involvement of voluntary action in our
case, but passive displacement in theirs. We suggest that
the cognitive motor system may predictively modulate sub-
jective time in a coherent and consistent way as part of vol-
untary action. In contrast, the brain cannot plan ahead to
guarantee a coherent experience of time for external sen-
sory events such as passive movement. In this sense, the
action system preconstructs a uniWed experience of subjec-
tive time, in contrast to our fragmented and revisable sen-
sory experience of time (Stetson et al. 2007).
Relation to other timing illusions
Voluntary actions may cause both compression and dilation
of subjective time. For example, in saccadic chronostasis
(Yarrow et al. 2001) participants judge the duration of the
Wrst postsaccadic stimulus to be longer than subsequently
presented reference stimuli. One explanation (Park et al.
2003) suggests that actions increase arousal, and thus inter-
nal clock rate. Our results cast doubt on this explanation.
First, we found TDT increases after operant actions, imply-
ing reduced rather than increased clock speed. Second, our
results show a compensatory dilation of subjective time that
rapidly follows initial action-induced compression. Such
dynamic changes are unlikely to reXect rapid and opposite
modulations of arousal.
Morrone et al. (2005) recently reported underestimation
of intervals between test stimuli immediately before a sac-
cade. This subjective compression is similar to our IE
eVect. However, we could not easily test TDT before the
self-paced actions of our study. In future work, we will test
whether clock-rate slows anticipatorily during preparation
of operant actions. A positive result would conWrm the link
between temporal discrimination and motor prediction (see
below). Action may also reverse temporal order judgements
(Morrone et al. 2005; Stetson et al. 2006). Impaired tempo-
ral discrimination would reduce the slope of the temporal
order judgement function. However, previous studies
reported action-related shifts in the function without slope
changes. Hence temporal order eVects may involve a time-
shift mechanism, independent of clock-rate modulations.
Neural mechanisms of action-related time modulation
Classical timing models (e.g., Treisman 1963; Gibbon et al.
1984) involve an internal clock, an accumulator (memory for
ticks), and a duration reference memory, against which the
accumulator readout is compared. We have proposed that
dynamic modulation of clock rates may occur during operant
action. Neuropsychological, neuroimaging and neurointer-
ventive evidence all suggest that the cerebellar cortex is
involved in millisecond timing of sensory and motor events
(for reviews see Ivry and Spencer 2004; Buhusi and Meck
2005). Arrival of parallel Wbre action potentials at successive
Purkinje cells’ dendritic trees was originally viewed as
cycling of an internal clock (Braitenberg 1967). However,
parallel  Wbre  Wring represents instantaneous sensorimotor
inputs to the cerebellum, whereas an internal clock should
cycle continuously, like a pacemaker. Nevertheless, cerebel-
lar activation in neuroimaging studies covaries with the inter-
val between actions and eVects (Blakemore et al. 2001).
Moreover, cerebellar lesions interfere with the precise timing
of predictive motor control in humans (Miall et al. 2007) and
also with anticipatory responses to sensory events, such as
conditioned eyeblinks (Perett et al. 1993; Gerwig et al.
2005). We therefore suggest that modulations of timing sig-
nals within the cerebellum could underlie both the compres-
sion of action-eVect intervals, and action-related modulation
of temporal discrimination, as part of a general process of
sensorimotor prediction when preparing active voluntary
movements. In contrast, a fronto-striatal network (cf. Buhusi
and Meck 2005) may provide Xexible timing for longer
intervals based on oscillatory activity in distributed cortical
circuits (Matell and Meck 2004).
Motor prediction and modulation of an internal clock
Current computational motor control models (Wolpert and
Miall 1996; Bays and Wolpert 2007) suggest that the motor
system predicts somatic and external eVects of actions. Pre-
vious studies (e.g., Blakemore et al. 1998) showed that
motor prediction leads to sensory attenuation of the pre-
dicted consequences of our actions. The pattern of timing
distortions reported here may also reXect motor prediction.
First, intentional binding at least partly reXects motor pre-
diction (Moore and Haggard 2008). Second, our results
show that intentional binding is related to clock slowing,
and that timing distortions were absent both following pas-
sive movements, and following actions that did not produce
predictable eVects. Both Wndings suggest that modulations
of neural timing mechanisms may occur as a consequence
of motor prediction.318 Exp Brain Res (2009) 196:311–318
123
Slowing an internal clock after action would boost the
temporal contiguity between actions and eVects, and also
increase the likelihood of an eVect occurring within a Wxed
number of clock cycles after action. That is, the prediction
interval would become shorter, and less variable. Both
inXuences would strengthen action-eVect associations
(Hommel et al. 2001), and give a strong basis for inferring
causality (Hume 1748; Eagleman and Holcombe 2002).
The term ‘sense of agency’ is sometimes (Haggard 2005)
used to describe the feeling that we are in control of events.
Agency may reXect a speciWc instance of causal inference
in the case of one’s own actions. Therefore, the modula-
tions of neural timing reported here may contribute to com-
putation of agency.
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